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The speaker’s linearization problem
B y  W. J. M. L e v e l t
Max-Planck-Institut fü r  Psycholinguistik, Berg en Dalseuieg 79, N L -6522 BC , Nijmegen,
The Netherlands
The process o f speaking is traditionally regarded as a m apping o f thoughts (intentions, 
feelings, etc.) onto language. O n e requirem ent that this m apping has to meet is that 
the units o f information to be expressed be strictly ordered. T h e channel of speech 
largely prohibits the simultaneous expression o f m ultiple propositions: the speaker has 
a linearization problem -  that is, a linear order has to be determ ined over any 
knowledge structure to be form ulated. T his m ayb e relatively simple i f  the informational 
structure has itself an intrinsic linear arrangem ent, as often occurs with event 
structures, but it requires special procedures i f  the structure is m ore complex, as is 
often the case in two- or three-dimensional spatial patterns. H ow , for instance, does 
a speaker proceed in describing his hom e, or the layout of his town?
T w o powerful constraints on linearization derive, on the one hand, from ‘ mutual 
know ledge’ and, on the other, from w orking m emory limitations. M utual knowledge 
may play a role in that the listener can be expected to derive different implicatures 
from different orderings (compare ‘ she m arried and becam e p regn an t’ with ‘ she 
became pregnant and married ’). M utual knowledge determ inants oflinearization are 
essentially pragm atic and cultural, and dependent on the content o f discourse. 
W orking memory limitations affect linearization in that a speaker’s linearization 
strategy will minimize memory load during the process o f form ulating. A  multidi­
mensional structure is broken up in such a w ay that the num ber o f ‘ return addresses’ 
to be kept in memory will be m inim ized. This is attained b y  maximizing the 
connectivity o f the discourse, and b y  backtracking to stored addresses in a first- 
in-last-out fashion. These m em ory determ inants of linearization are presumably 
biological, and independent o f the dom ain o f discourse.
A n important question is w hether the linearization requirem ent is enforced by the 
oral m odality o f speech or w hether it is a deeper m odality-independent property of 
language use.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
W henever a speaker wants to express anything more than the most simple assertions, requests, 
commands, etc., he or she has to solve w h at I shall call the linearization problem-, the speaker 
w ill have to decide on what to say first, w h at to say next, and so on. T h o u gh  the linearization 
problem  has been the subject of pedagogical and philosophical treatises from pre-Aristotelian 
times until the nineteenth century, the issue is curiously absent from present-day psycholinguistic 
literature.
T h e sixteenth-century humanist philosopher Pierre de la  Ram ee explains the linearization 
problem  by giving the example o f a teacher who plans to give a course in grammar (Ramus 
1546, p. 83):
Let us suppose that all the rules, definitions, and divisions o f gram m ar have been ascertained, 
that all the examples used in gram m ar have been found, and that all these things have been
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truly and correctly ‘judged’. Let us suppose that all these prescriptions are w r it t e n  out each 
on a separate little ticket, and all of these thoroughly mixed in an urn, as for a  g a m e  o f  blanque. 
Now I ask what part of dialectic would teach me how to put together all th ese  m ixed-up 
precepts and to reduce them to order.
Ramus makes a careful distinction between this ordering and two other aspects o f  the generation 
of discourse. The first one is the retrieval and judgem ent of the things to be e x p re sse d . Ram us 
puts it this way:
There is no need here of dialectical invention to discover the precepts, for all h a v e  been found 
and all the parts tested and judged. There is no need here of syllogism, b e c a u s e  w h a t is true 
here is already understood.
In other words, for Ramus arrangement follows, or at least presupposes, retrieval and 
judgement. The other aspects to be distinguished from ordering is the choice o f l in g u is t ic  means 
to express such an ordered string of thoughts. Here, Ramus breaks with t h e  traditional 
treatment of linearization. From the classical era onwards, arrangement is d iscussed  in rhetoric 
texts in the chapter on disposition But rhetoric has to do with oratio, the faculty o f s p e e c h , whereas 
Ramus repeatedly stresses that arrangement and judgem ent are independent o f  the faculty o f 
speech, and are solely a matter of the faculty of thought, or ratio (see N u ch e lm a n s  1980, p. 
17). The linearization problem, therefore, should not be treated as a problem o f  lan gu age, but 
as a problem of thought, and Ramus consequently handles it, just as he does s y llo g is m , as part 
of dialectic rather than of rhetoric.
As far as this goes, I am a Ram ist: in studying the speaker’s generation of d isco u rse  one should 
carefully distinguish between the selection of information to be expressed, the o r d e r in g  of this 
information for expression, and the linguistic formulation of the information. A  discussion o f 
the speaker’s linearization problem should, more specifically, avoid stating th e  issue in terms 
of the ordering of clauses, sentences, utterances, or other linguistic units. T h e  en tities  should 
be units in a language of thought, which are, admittedly, even harder to d e fin e  than units o f 
a natural language (see Fodor 1975). the eventual terminology used by R a m u s , these units 
were arguments -  roughly equivalent to concepts -  and axioms, which are a rg u m e n ts  com bined 
into statements.
Making this strict separation between thought and language does not, of c o u r s e , entail a 
denial of their interaction. The grammar of a language may put certain b o u n d a r y  conditions 
on the order in which thoughts can be expressed, and the order of expression d e c id e d  on will 
in turn limit the choice of appropriate grammatical forms. None the less, the t w o  systems m ay 
differ substantially in their main principles of organization.
What are the principles underlying the speaker’s linearization in discourse? A s  I rem arked 
above, there is virtually nothing in the psycholinguistic literature relating to th is  issue, in spite 
of the fact that it should figure centrally in any theory o f the speaker. In the fo llo w in g  I shall 
sketch some main principles of linearization as I see them. They are partly s p e cu la tiv e , but 
in large part also based on empirical research. I shall begin with the sp ecu lative  p art, which 
concerns principles that are related to the content o f discourse. I shall then t u r n  to the more 
empirically based part, which deals with principles that derive from process req u irem en ts in
f  See for instance, the Latin text on rhetoric, which is traditionally, but erroneously, attributed t o  M arcu s Tullius 
(Cicero) (ca. 85 B.C.). Kempen & van Wijk (1981) were the first to relate this text to the lin e a riz a tio n  problem.
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the generation o f discourse. A  final section will comment on the relation between linearization 
and the oral modality of speech.
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C o n t e n t - r e l a t e d  p r i n c i p l e s
The art o f rhetoric has been developed to effectively influence or persuade the audience. Every 
main aspect o f this art, be it invention, elocution or pronunciation, is dedicated to this goal. 
Linearization, too, serves the main purpose of evoking certain inferences in the mind o f the 
listener. Order is one determinant o f implicature, as Lyons (1977), G azdar (1979, 1980) and 
others have shown. An example from Kempson (1975) suffices to illustrate this. I f  the context 
is not too far-fetched, the following piece of discourse sounds distinctly o d d :
(1) The Lone Ranger rode off into the sunset. He m ounted his horse.
O rder o f mention apparently implicates order of events, and the w ay to put things should 
therefore be the other way round:
(2) The Lone Ranger mounted his horse. H e rode o ff into the sunset.
T h e  old principle in rhetoric corresponding to this is known as ordo naturalist N atural order 
is, so to speak, the unmarked form o f linearization. All other orders, the so-called artifical orders, 
are designed to create special attentional or aesthetic effects. A  psycholinguistic consideration 
o f  linearization can most profitably start out with the unmarked case.
Three questions have to be asked. The first is: what makes natural order so effective for speaker 
and listener? The second one is how  to define natural order for different domains of discourse. 
A nd the third issue is: what will happen if a domain does not allow for a unique natural order? 
L et us consider these issues in turn.
The principle of natural order m ay have two related, but still different, psychological sources. 
Both are extensively discussed in O sgood’s recent book (1980), w hich includes a very interesting 
chapter on naturalness. A  first source is the organization of the speaker’s own -  prelinguistic -  
experience. An event structure, for instance, is in our culture quite likely memorized in such 
a way that consecutive events are more closely associated than non-consecutive events. 
Retrieving this information for expression will be relatively easy i f  each just-retrieved event can 
function as a retrieval cue for the next event. Experimental evidence for this conjecture can 
be found in Mandler & Johnson (1977). I shall return to this use o f  connectivity in the next 
section on process-related principles. T h e other source o f natural order is conversational. I f  the 
speaker intends the listener to derive certain implicatures from the order in which things are 
said, he should base his speech on m utual knowledge. There is general knowledge in our culture 
that causes precede effects, that means are sought before ends are achieved, that planning pre­
cedes execution, etc. By using the unmarked order the speaker can m ake sure that the listener will 
correctly apply such knowledge, and come up with the intended im plicature. There are, more­
over, stereotypical orders of events in our culture, such as paying after eating in restaurants (see 
Schank & Abelson 1977), stereotypical spatial arrangements (see Linde & Labov (1975) on 
apartment arrangements and their descriptions, and UIImer-Ehrich (1979) and Ullm er-Ehrich 
&  Koster (1980) on living room  arrangements and descriptions), and other stereotypical 
arrangements that a speaker can assume to be knowledge shared w ith the listener. By following 
such arrangements in the order o f  expression, the speaker facilitates the listener’s comprehension.
t  Though they are often confused, natural order theories o f disposilio should be distinguished from " atura  ^order 
theories of grammar. The latter concern word order in sentences. For a discussion of these, see Leve t (19 7).
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Here the speaker’s and the listener’s interests are likely to coincide: if the speaker’s retrieval 
process is, in part, governed by w hat is stereotypic in the culture, the listener will be able to 
use the same stereotype to encode and store the information. The short answer, therefore, to 
the question o f w hat makes natural order so natural is that it allows for easy retrieval on the 
part o f the speaker and for easy inference on the part of the listener, given shared general or 
more specific knowledge in the speech community. A t the same time, the culture dependency 
of natural order cannot be stressed enough. Becker (1980), for instance, shows that the 
Aristotelian tem poral-causal sequencing is no basis for linearization in Javanese W ayang, but 
rather something he calls ‘ coincidence’ , which is a deep motive for action in the culture.
T h e second question, o f how natural order relates to different domains of discourse, will never 
be answered exhaustively: there are as many natural orders as there are things to talk about, 
and one should be careful to avoid the morasses of content analysis. One more general 
observation can, however, be made: if the structure to be expressed is itself linearly arranged, 
the unmarked or natural w ay is to follow that order. For event structures the rule is to follow 
the order o f  events, as we have seen. For linear spatial structures it is to follow the spatial 
connectivity. This is especially apparent in the giving o f route directions, which has been studied 
by K lein  (1979, 1981) and others in our institute (see also Munro 1977; Wunderlich & Reinelt 
1981). T h e task o f giving someone a route direction requires, first, the retrieval o f the shortest 
route through some more-dimensional representation and, secondly, the expression of this 
shortest route. T h e  latter is always performed by following the route’s linear connectivity, 
though this is by no means the only logical possibility. Sometimes structures are partly organized 
in terms o f subordination, and the linearization follows the route from superordinated to 
subordinated items. This is, for instance, so with a computer program designed by Collins et 
a l  (1975) that teaches geography. The authors claim that this superordination to subordination 
arrangem ent o f  topics implemented in the program had been observed in natural tutorial 
sessions. It sounds like a late echo o f the genus-species orderings propagated in rhetoric texts 
across the ages.
T h e  third question is w hat will happen if the dom ain of discourse has no linear arrangement, 
and thus cannot directly m ap onto a unique order o f  expression. This may occasionally be so 
for event structures, as when events have a simultaneous arrangement. It is the normal case 
for two- or more-dimensional spatial structures, and for many other domains of discourse. The 
only em pirical evidence about what happens in such cases concerns the description of 
multidimensional spatial structures. Since the appearance o f Linde & Labov’s (1975) seminal 
paper on apartm ent descriptions, much'attention has been devoted, especially at our institute, 
to how people express and formulate spatial information (Klein 1979, 1981; Ullmer-Ehrich 
& K oster 1980; Levelt 1979, 1981). O ne major result of these studies is this: the dominant 
strategy for linearizing a spatial structure is by projecting an event structure onto it. Speakers 
tend to make a mental tour through space, either a body tour (e.g. in apartment descriptions 
or route directions), or w hat we have called a gaze tour (in living room or network descriptions). 
As a result, spatial links become expressed by temporal connectives (‘ and then’), with abundant 
use o f verbs o f motion and the like. The natural order rule for event structures is thus extended 
to spatial structures, w hich become only ‘ indirectly’ described via the event structures defined 
over them. It is not fully clear w hy speakers resort to these tour solutions. One advantage of 
the strategy is surely that speaker and hearer share substantial knowledge about the touring 
o f cities and apartm ents, and a temporal description easily invites the intended inferences about
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the spatial layout. Still, though the tem poral solution is guaranteed to be linear, it is by no 
means unique. M utual knowledge w ill be one determ inant o f the tour’s path; processing 
requirements will be another. Let us now turn to these process-related principles o f 
linearization.
P r o c e s s - r e l a t e d  p r i n c i p l e s
The orderly expression of complex inform ation requires a system o f book-keeping on the part 
o f  the speaker. It is, first, necessary to keep track o f w hat has been said and what is still to 
be expressed. This may be a simple m atter for linear structures, but it requires special memory
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F ig u re  1. Examples of linear (a), hierarchical (b) and loop (c) structures to be described by subjects.
Nodes are differently coloured in the test patterns.
devices for more complex information, as I shall show in a m om ent. Secondly, a cooperative 
speaker will bear in mind the needs o f  the listener, who has to try to reconstruct the complex 
structure from the linearly ordered discourse. T he com plexity o f  the demands made on the 
listener will, among other things, be affected by the speaker’s use o f modal, anaphoric and 
deictic expressions, which signal how  the form ulated inform ation is to be resynthesized. It will 
also be affected by the speaker’s choice o f particular orders o f expression.
In the following I shall argue that these book-keeping requirem ents impose restrictions on 
the linearization process that are o f a quite general nature: they are independent of the 
information content, and are in that respect quite different from content-related principles o f  
linearization discussed earlier.
I shall, however, try to explain these process-related principles o f  linearization with the help 
o f  the very restricted domain o f discourse that we have used to study them. The discourse is 
about spatial, grid-like networks, as in figure 1, consisting o f  differently coloured nodes, 
connected by horizontal or vertical arcs. T h e  patterns could have a linear structure, as in figure 
1 a, a hierarchical structure involving m ultiply branching nodes, as in figure 1 b, or an even 
more complex loop-structure as in figure 1 c. W e showed such patterns to subjects and asked 
them to describe the figure in such a w ay  as to enable the next subject to correctly draw it 
on the basis of the tape-recorded description. W e instructed the speakers to start the description 
a t the node marked by the arrow.
How would a speaker organize his book-keeping when describing such patterns? Notice that 
book-keeping is necessary here in spite o f  the fact that the patterns are visually present during 
the task: the speaker should rem em ber w hich parts o f  the pattern he has already described, 
and in some cases which nodes he w ill have to return to at later stages of the description. I 
constructed two linearization models th at for each pattern in the dom ain would yield as output 
a  linear sequence over all nodes and arcs o f the pattern. T h e  models would thus predict the 
subject’s order of expressions of the different parts o f the pattern.
It suffices for the present discussion to exam ine one o f these models only. The model consists
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of two parts, one non-deterministic and one probabilistic. The n o n - d e t e r m i m s t . i c  part is a 
so-called augmented transition network (a.t.n.). It is given in figure 2. T h e  p re c ise  w orking 
of this a.t.n. has been described elsewhere (Levelt 1981 A). W hat mainly c o n c e r n s  us here is the 
general principles on which its construction is based, since these are the process-restrictions that
we claim to be general and content-independent.
A  first major principle is the maximization o f connectivity. For the present p a tte rn s  the principle 
implies that, whenever possible, the next node to be described has an a r c - c o n n e c t i o n  to  the last 
node mentioned. Or, in other words, the connectivity principle says that a c o m p le x  inform ation
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transition
1
condition 
network entrance
action
make entry statement; reduce valency of entrance n o d e  by 1
other than network entrance enter loop if recognized at transition (2); select an d  describe 
move, reduce val, o f node left and of node entered b y  1
2 node val. = 1 describe node
node is loop entrance 
and val. > 1 describe node
3 node val. > 1 describe node
4 node val. > 1 seek M/F
5 node val. = 1 —
6 node val. = 0 stop
7 node val. = 0 describe node, stop
structure is linearized as much as possible without ‘ lifting the pencil’ : new c o n c e p ts  should, 
wherever possible, be introduced by virtue of their communicatively relevant re la tio n s  to the 
most recent concept expressed.
In various experiments with patterns of the sort exemplified here (L ev e lt 19 8 1« , b) we 
have gathered almost 4000 descriptions. Violations o f the connectivity principle a r e  quite ra re : 
they never occur for patterns that are themselves linear, as in figure 1 a; their o n ly  noticeable 
occurrence is where there are loops, as in figure 1 c, but even there they are r e la tiv e ly  infrequent. 
Connectivity is also a desirable property for the listener, because the new in fo rm a tio n  can be 
linked to the most recent items, which will normally still be available in w o rk in g  m em ory.
It is, of course, not always possible for the speaker to introduce new items in  a  connected 
way without repeating old ones. I f  the pattern is hierarchical, as in figure 1 b, th e  a .t.n . chooses 
one or the other exit arc of the choice node in a non-deterministic way; w hen i t  com es to the 
end of the branch it jumps back to the choice node to describe the other b r a n c h . T h is  return 
jump violates the connectivity principle. The only way to preserve co n n ectiv ity  w ould  be to 
retrace all the old items and to return step-by-step to the choice node. This is e x a c t ly  the w ay
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that returns are dealt with in the other a.t.n. model, which is not discussed here. The principled 
issue is this: when choice items are returned to by way of a jum p, i.e. in disconnected way, 
as with the a.t.n. of figure 2, how does the speaker keep track of the returns to be made? I f  
choice items are embedded, as in figure 1 b, i.e. if the speaker reaches a new choice node before 
having returned to the earlier one, how is he going to schedule his returns? Does he return 
to the form er one first, or the latter?
The second major principle says that returns to choice items are made in first-in-last-out fashion. 
T h e a.t.n. o f  figure 2 is equipped with a push-down stack where return addresses are stored 
one on top o f  the other, as they come in. Coming to the end of a linear branch, control jum ps 
back to the top item on store. This is recursively done till the stack is empty. Another w ay o f 
expressing the principle is to say that it minimizes the size of return jumps. This second 
process-principle seems to be quite robust as well. We found less than 3 % violations in 297 
descriptions o f patterns involving embedded, and multiply embedded, choice nodes. It is likely, 
but not yet empirically demonstrated, that this way of ordering return moves is also 
advantageous to the listener; the corresponding a.t.n. model that we have made for the listener 
shows the same push-down property.
M axim ization of connectivity, and first-in-last-out return to choice items, are the main 
principles on which the non-deterministic part of the linearization model is based. Together, 
they give linearization the ‘ depth-first’ character that is so typical for human problem-solving 
(Newell &  Simon 1972). Let us now turn to the probabilistic part. The model so far was 
non-deterministic in that it did not specify the order of choice at a choice item: that is, which 
branch w ill come first in the speaker’s linear order, which one he will take after return, etc. 
T h e probabilistic part of the model predicts a speaker’s tendencies or preferences in this respect. 
Again, the m odel’s details are based on a principle of quite general character, which should 
be applicable to any complex domain o f  discourse.
T h e third major principle says that a speaker will tend to order his choices at a m ultiply 
branching item in such a way as to minimize the load o f memorizing return addresses. This principle 
can best be exemplified by splitting it up in two parts, the first part to do with the duration o f 
memory load, the second with size of load.
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F igu re  3. Pattern for testing minimization of duration of memory load. (Colours have been replaced by initials
of colour names.)
Figure 3 exemplifies the case of minimization of duration. When arriving at the green choice 
node the speaker can choose either to take the left branch first, or to begin with the right branch. 
In both cases he will later have to return to the green choice node to describe the other branch. 
But there is a difference: if  the longer right branch is described first, the speaker w ill have to 
keep in m ind the return address longer than if the shorter left branch is described first. It was 
therefore predicted that in this and similar cases there would be a higher probability for the
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speaker to order choices from shorter to longer branches. In the experiments we found a clear 
confirmation of these prediction (Levelt 19816).
M inimization of size of load can be illustrated with the pattern in figure 4 . Here again there 
is a choice at the green node, but now the num ber of elements to be described is the same to 
the left and the right. The two branches differ, however, in that the right one contains another 
choice node. If  the speaker were to describe this right branch first, then at some moment he 
would not only have to keep the first green choice node in mind as a return address, but also 
the second yellow node. This will not be so i f  the left branch is described first, since after having 
returned to the green choice node this can be released from memory, and there will thus be 
no moment where the speaker will have to keep track o f two different nodes to return to. For
this and similar patterns we thus predicted a higher probability ofdescibing simpler before more 
complex branches. This, again, was clearly confirmed in the experiments.
Note that these minimization strategies can be advantageous to the listener as well. I f  the 
listener is aware of the speaker’s intention to return to an item at a later point in the discourse, 
then also the listener will try and keep track o f these return addresses. This awareness on the 
part o f the listener may be the result o f more or less explicit cues in the speaker’s wording, 
ranging from explicit mention (‘ we will return to this crossing point’) to the use of more implicit 
modal expressions (‘ here you may go right ’). I f  the listener can guess that a return will be made, 
the speaker’s load minimizing strategies will also reduce effort for the listener.
To summarize the process-related principles, our conjecture is, first, that the speaker will 
be maximally connective when introducing new items of information, secondly, that he will 
return to choice items in inverse order, and finally, that he will order his paths from a choice 
item in such a way as to minimize keeping track o f return addresses. It is interesting to observe 
that the combination of these principles is form ally equivalent to what is known as Y ngve’s 
depth hypotheses (Yngve 1961). Y ngve predicted maximization of right-branchingness for 
syntactic structures given the speaker’s processing restrictions. Similarly, the present theory of 
linearization predicts maximization o f right-branchingness for discourse structures, at least in 
so far as discourse is affected by processing restrictions. The arguments that Miller & Chomsky 
(1963) formulated against Yngve’s theory, nam ely that the listener’s processing requirements 
would favour left-brachingness, do not hold for the linearization theory: as we have pointed 
out, each o f the principles may be advantageous for the listener as well. The empirical issue 
for a general theory of linearization is therefore to show a predominance of right-brachingness 
for discourse structures. We have shown this to hold for the present domain of spatial patterns, 
but we have no more than anecdotal evidence to this effect for other domains o f discourse.
© -------(br)------- (pu)------- (bla)------- 1
♦
F igure 4. Pattern for testing minimization of size o f memory load.
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L i n e a r i z a t i o n  a n d  t h e  o r a l  m o d a l i t y  o f  l a n g u a g e
W hat is the origin of the speaker’s linearization problem? There is an obvious and rather 
trivial answer to this question. It is that the requirement to linearize is due to the oral m odality 
o f  lan gu age. our vocal apparatus is not equipped for the simultaneous expression o f  complex 
inform ation. Even if  one agrees that some simultaneity o f expression can be observed in 
coarticulation within and between syllables, or more clearly in the parallel expression o f  
segmental and suprasegmental information, one would also have to admit that it is impossible 
to utter two or more sentences at the same time.
Still, there is reason to suppose that the linearization requirement is modality-independent, 
having m ore to do with our limited abilities in dealing with propositional information than 
with the technical restrictions of our vocal apparatus. There are two reasons worth m entioning: 
the first is that even if the speaker could miraculously speak with two voices simultaneously, 
the listener would be quite unable to cope with it. A  long and impressive tradition o f 
experim entation by Broadbent and his associates (see Broadbent 1971) has left no doubt that 
listeners have great difficulty in dealing with simultaneously spoken sentences. This occurs even 
when the utterances are dichotically presented, one to the left and one to the right ear. T h e  
argum ent that such speakers do not exist, and that listeners have thus no experience with this 
situation, is invalid: it is quite normal and quite frequent to be confronted with the simultaneous 
speech o f several speakers. But the way in which humans deal with this ‘ cocktail party ’ situation 
is to attend selectively to only one speaker at any one moment.
The second reason is an even more compelling one. There are natural languages that do 
not make use o f the oral-auditory modality, and which could, technically, allow for simultaneity 
o f  utterances. These are the native sign languages of the deaf. In American Sign Language 
(A .S .L .), and probably in all sign language, a sign can be made by either hand; there is free 
alternation. Therefore, nothing would prevent simultaneous signing with both hands. I have, 
in fact, observed various instances of simultaneous signing. In most cases the one hand holds 
a static classifier while the other hand signs the focal information, which entertains some relation 
to this classifier. T h e first hand therefore has an anaphoric function, not unlike the deictic 
function o f  a pointing gesture when we say ‘ there is the book’ . In one case I observed the use 
o f  a com m on noun by one hand and the simultaneous utterance of a relative clause b y  the other 
hand. So some simultaneity can be observed in the use of A .S.L., but at the same time there 
is no doubt that it is ungrammatical in A.S.L. to sign two complete sentence tokens 
simultaneously (see Levelt (1980) for further discussion of these issues). W e do not know whether 
the native A .S.L . observer would be able to comprehend simultaneous utterances; these 
experiments have never been done. But though the visual system seems to be designed for 
parallel processing, one should not expect positive results. The situation will probably be no 
better than for simultaneous reading tasks. There, we know it is sometimes possible to register 
single words in parallel (Willows & M acKinnon 1973)1 but there is no indication o f  
simultaneous processing o f sentence-type units.
W ith these remarks I shall return to the Ramist position that I endorsed in the Introduction. 
T h e issue o f  linearization has to be dealt wth in the realm of ratio, the faculty of thought, not 
in the realm  o f oralio, the faculty of speech (for further experimental evidence relating to this 
distinction, see Levelt & Maassen (1981)). The requirement to linearize is an attentional one 
that applies equally well to the use o f languages that do not involve speech as to any thought
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process involving prepositional information, such as doing arithmetic, playing chess, or 
planning a lecture on the speaker’s linearization problem.
I am grateful to Else Barth, Gerard K em pen, William Marslen-Wilson and Gabriel 
Nuchelmans for discussions and comments in connection with this paper.
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Discussion
R. B. L e  P a g e  (Department o f Language, University o f York, U .K .). I was interested in this paper 
since it seemed that it might offer some insight into the processes of pidginization w ith  which 
I am concerned. Linguistic simplification is often cited as one of the universal processes that 
take place in a contact situation leading to the formation of a pidgin. The trouble is that there 
is no overall measure of linguistic complexity, so that simplification of one kind often leads to 
greater com plexity of another. Is it not strange that all the subjects in this experim ent arrived 
at the same kind of resultant of the varying possibilities for simplicity? Suppose that I described 
figure 4 by likening it to a map of the Central London Underground line, with access say from 
A dlw ych to Green in the west-east sequence Pink, Brown, Purple, Black, Green, R ed , Yellow , 
and a north—south spur from the eastern Yellow. For a member of m y culture this use o f a 
cultural stereotype -  a map -  would make recognition very easy, even though it m ight to others 
seem more complex than the linear sequences used by Professor Levelt’s subjects.
W . J. M . L e v e l t ,  In my paper I specified two kinds of determinants of linearization: those 
having to do with mutual knowledge about the topic of discourse, and those related to the 
economy of'b ook-keep in g ’, or working memory. Professor Le Page’s example belongs to the 
first kind: in London a speaker may assume common knowledge o f Underground trajectory 
maps, and use the stereotype to encode the pattern. Such knowledge cannot be assumed in 
Nijm egen, where the experiment was run. Still, Professor Le Page touches upon two im portant 
questions to which my present findings provide no definite answers. T he first is how  speakers 
in a particular culture decide on a stereotypical way of expressing the inform ation: the very 
uniform ways of description that appear not only in our experiments but also in Linde &  L ab o v’s 
and in other studies show that there must exist very strict criteria in a given speech com m unity 
for selecting or rejecting a basis for description. In the pidgin situation the boundaries o f m utual 
knowledge are very restricted, and I would suspect that a speaker would be particularly careful 
not to cross them, i.e. that his criteria would be very conservative. The second question is w hat 
happens if the use of a particular stereotype would lead to violations o f connectivity, or other 
book-keeping principles, as in the Underground example. The empirical basis o f m y experiments 
is too lim ited to answer this question, but we have observed cases where speakers try to preserve 
both, so for instance by saying ‘ This is like a big T ’, and then resorting to a fully connected 
description.
H .  C . L o n g u e t - H i g g i n s ,  F .R .S .  [Laboratory o f Experimental Psychology, University o f  Sussex, U .K .). 
In inviting his subjects to describe the spatial layout of the graphs, Professor L evelt instructed 
them to begin at the node marked with an arrow. Might this not have predisposed them  to giving 
a description based on a quasi-temporal exploration of the graph?
W . J. M . L e v e l t .  It was essential, for the experimental testing of our models, to fixate the 
starting node. This may indeed have induced a temporal way of description in our subjects. 
Still m any subjects did give non-temporal structural information in spite o f the arrow, but 
even then they almost always kept to the predicted order o f mention. It should, 
furtherm ore, be observed that very similar touring strategies occurred in Linde &  L ab ov’s 
study o f apartm ent descriptions, in which no starting point was indicated to the informant.
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